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World 
Adham Saouli* 
This article contributes to debates that aim to go beyond the 
‘democratisation’ and ‘post-democratisation’ paradigms to understand 
change and continuity in Arab politics. In tune with calls to focus on the 
actualities of political dynamics, the article shows that the literatures on 
State Formation and Contentious Politics provide useful theoretical tools to 
understand change/continuity in Arab politics. It does so by examining the 
impact of the latest Arab Uprisings on state formation trajectories in Iraq 
and Syria. The Uprisings have aggravated a process of regime erosion—
which originated in post-colonial state-building attempts—by mobilising 
sectarian and ethnic identities and exposing the counties to geo-political 
rivalries and intervention, giving rise to trans-border movements, such as 
ISIS. The resulting state fragmentation has obstructed democratic 
transition in Syria and constrained its consolidation in Iraq.  
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This study examines the impact of the Arab uprisings on state formation in the Arab 
world, with emphasis on Iraq and Syria. I argue that the uprisings have exacerbated a 
process of state fragmentation, which has roots in long-term state-building processes in 
the postcolonial era. In this process, the ability of regimes to monopolise power 
domestically was eroding and the states’ immunity against external penetration was 
waning.  In Syria and Iraq, the uprisings had two direct impacts. First, they accelerated 
sectarian and ethnic mobilisation, which was latent under the ideological hegemony of 
Arab nationalism, but had gradually became salient, especially after the fall of Saddam 
Hussein in 2003 and the uprising in Syria in 2011. This not only sharply increased long-
standing challenges to the monopoly of power by ruling regimes, but also has 
contributed to state disintegration and blocked attempts to reform their political 
systems. Secondly, they accentuated Iraq and Syria’s vulnerability to external 
penetration by rival regional powers, making state reformation even more difficult.   
The article is divided into two main sections. Theoretically, I argue that an 
understanding of political change and continuity in the Arab world requires moving 
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beyond the ‘democratization’ and ‘post-democratization’ frameworks. Following on calls 
to refocus scholarly attention on the actualities of political dynamics, in the first section, 
I argue that an examination of state formation and the contentious politics that 
punctuate this process provide useful avenues to understand political change and 
continuity in the Arab world. Bringing in the state formation literature provides 
historical depth to current political upheavals in the Middle East, such as the Arab 
uprisings. In focusing on trajectories of state formation in varying contexts, we examine 
how state-building attempts engender anti-regime political mobilisation, creating 
contentious politics. Contentious politics activate latent identities, mobilise passive 
populations, and give rise to new ideologies and actors, creating opportunities for 
political change, of which democratisation is only one possibility. Whilst I argue that an 
understanding of the socio-political conditions that could facilitate or obstruct 
democratisation is socially important, we should not allow this to determine or distort 
our analysis of politics in the region.  
 In the second section I present an empirical analysis on the impact of the Arab 
uprisings on Iraqi and Syrian state formation. First, I analyse how the post-colonial 
state-building processes in Iraq and Syria contributed to regime erosion. This will set 
the historical context to then examine the impact of the current uprisings on each of the 
two cases. I conclude the study by assessing the conditions that could facilitate or hinder 
democratisation in Iraq and Syria.  
 
Political change, continuity and development in the Arab world 
Before and beyond democratization and authoritarian resilience 
Attempts to understand political change and continuity in the Middle East have centred 
on two intersecting questions: First, how do we explain the absence of democracy in the 
Arab world? Second, how do we explain regime resilience in the region? Whilst the 
answer to the latter question should provide insights to the former, the two waves of 
literatures that contributed frameworks to answers these questions remained 
analytically divorced. The first, which emerged in the 1990s, focused on Arab states’ 
resistance to the ‘third wave’ democratisations, continuing a legacy initiated by 
modernisation theories of the 1950s and 1960s.1 The absences of a civil society, a strong 
bourgeoisie, democratic political culture or democratic interlocutors were all advanced 
as explanations for the absence of democracy in the region2. However, disenchanted by 
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the faltering hope of political change in the region scholars moved to a ‘post-
democratisation’ paradigm that examined ‘how political rule in the Arab countries is 
effectuated, organized, and executed’ to generate stability and regime survival.3 
Then came the Arab uprisings in 2010/11. Two ostensibly entrenched 
authoritarian leaders (Bin Ali of Tunisia and Mubarak of Egypt) were toppled in a matter 
of few weeks, triggering a wave of uprisings in other Arab countries. Academic 
responses to the uprisings reflected the two dominating paradigms. Some regional 
experts argued that a focus on the ‘myth of authoritarian stability’ had missed the 
underlying factors that caused the winds of change.4 However, with the return of the 
military to power in Egyptian politics, emergence of civil wars in Syria, Libya, Iraq, and 
Yemen, constrained transition in Tunisia, and regime survival in Morocco, Jordan and 
the Gulf, others observed continuities in Arab politics5.  
 Nevertheless, despite the greater pace, intensity, and innovations in political 
protest, the latest uprisings do not represent a total break with previous forms of 
political contention in the Arab world. For example in 2005, Beirut was engulfed by 
Midan al-Tahrir-like protests, framed as a “Cedar Revolution” after the assassination of 
Lebanon’s Prime Minister Rafic Hariri. The ousting of Muammar al-Qaddafi in 2011—a 
combination of accumulated domestic opposition and external military intervention—is, 
to a degree, similar to the ousting of Saddam Hussein in 2003. In Egypt, the toppling of 
Mubarak in 2011, which paved the way for the election of the Muslim Brotherhood, 
which in turn led to a deep political polarisation in Egypt providing the opportunity for 
the military to return to the political arena, is comparable to the elections of the 
Islamists in Algeria; there the refusal of the army to surrender to the ballot boxes 
triggered a civil war of the 1990s. A comparison between the current civil war in Syria 
and the Baathist-Muslim Brotherhood bloody struggle of 1978-82 reveals similar 
processes, albeit with different outcomes. In each case the main political contention was 
between entrenched and ostensibly secular regimes and an Islamist opposition.  
 Hence, it should not come as a surprise that scholarly responses to the uprisings 
have fluctuated between explanations of change and continuity. However, the analytical 
link between political change and continuity in Arab politics remains to be established. 
One reason for the absence of such an analytical link is the democracy factor. This factor 
has framed and in some cases determined how we think about political change in the 
Arab world. In searching for the “absence of democracy”, scholarly attention has been 
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diverted away from developing methods, concepts and theories to understand how 
politics actually works.6 The call for a ‘post-democratisation’ paradigm may have 
contributed to bring politics back in to the analysis; however, its focus on regime 
resilience comes at the expense of missing interesting forms of resistance against 
domination, and hence an understandings of potential originators of change 7. An 
examination of the ‘genealogy of resistance’8, for example the politicisation, rise, and 
development of Shi’a political Islam in opposition to Baathist domination in Iraq, could 
be very useful to understand and explain strategies of regime adaptation, state 
reformation or political change in contemporary Iraq.  
Moving beyond the democratisation and post-democratisation requires the 
settling of two issues. First, there is a need to move one step back to analyse politics as a 
domain of domination and resistance that, especially in the Arab world, takes place in 
processes of state making and unmaking in varying political contexts.9  This involves a 
‘return to the classic question about what politics is and what are the relevant political 
fields and actors’10.  
Second, it is important to free political analysis from normative frames, while 
recognizing that normative concerns continue to shape societies’ interests in the 
political world. Political analysis cannot be indifferent to many Arabs’ resistance to the 
violence, injustice, and corruption of authoritarianism,11 and understanding its causes 
and the conditions for democratic transition are socially important—not only for a 
Western audience of American political science, donors or policymakers12. But answers 
to this normative goal would first require an understanding of the political world. 
 
Bringing politics back in: State formation and Contentious Politics 
In this section, I will argue that a focus on state formation/deformation processes and 
the contentious politics they generate offers two main advantages in understanding 
political change in the Arab world. First, it contributes to the identification of the 
underlying struggles that gives politics its shape and direction: despite the varying paths 
to state formation, the direction of the process is universally similar: a drive to centralise 
(especially coercive) power as a pre-requisite to institutionalise order and to facilitate 
socio-economic development. Second, this drive almost always generates resistance by 
dissatisfied challengers, spawning contentious politics. I start by sketching the state 
formation process. 
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The collapse of the Ottoman Empire led to the emergence of political boundaries 
(initially envisioned as European spheres of influence). Unlike European state formation 
processes, boundaries in the Arab world came before states and constituted the social 
environments within which states could form, deform, or develop. State formation pits 
regimes against their challengers in struggles aiming to dominate three analytically 
separate but interrelated domains of social life: the coercive, ideological, and the socio-
economic. 13  
By monopolising coercion (control over the tools of violence such as the police, 
security, army, courts) an actor prevents its rivals from similar tools of violence that 
would otherwise threaten it. Starting in the 1950s in republics such as Egypt, Iraq, Syria, 
Yemen or Libya, we observe a varying but steady process of increasing domination by 
the army over political life, usually at the expense of other social and political forces.14 In 
monarchical regimes, such as Jordan or Saudi Arabia, royal families directly 
monopolised coercion. Secondly, depending on the cultural composition of a society, 
regimes articulated relevant ideologies to legitimise their rule and dominate the 
ideological sphere. In Saudi Arabia, King Abdel Aziz used a Wahhabi interpretation of 
Islam to help overcome tribal and regional divisions in the nascent kingdom; it then 
became the state ideology. Populist regimes (Egypt, Iraq, Syria, Yemen) of the 1950s and 
1960s championed ideas of Arab Nationalism, socialism, anti-colonialism and national 
independence, de-legitimising the rule of their predecessors and repressing competing 
frameworks, such as Islamism. The Arab uprisings have shown that the ideological 
sphere continues to be an area of contention among Islamists, nationalists, and, 
increasingly, sub-state sectarian communities. Finally, controlling the economic sphere 
was essential to state formation. Whilst tax-collection in European state formation was 
crucial for kings to wage war and suppress internal rivals15, in the Middle East rent from 
natural resources or external patrons has been essential to augment the co-optative 
power of regimes in oil-rich monarchies or strategically located states, such as Jordan. In 
populist republics of the 1950s and the 1960s, redistribution from state-led 
development (agrarian reform, industrialisation, import-substitution) became 
comparable vehicles for co-optation needed for regime survival.   
Successful domination over the coercive, economic, and ideological spheres gave 
rise to political regimes16 of varying types. But these were far from consolidated ‘states’, 
understood here as institutions (set of norms, rules and practices) that regulate but 
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stand above political struggles and actors. In early state formation, a regime is one 
dominant group ruling over others in a particular jurisdiction. As Max Weber argues: 
‘Like the political institutions historically preceding it the state is a relation of men 
dominating men, a relation supported by means of legitimate (i.e. considered to be 
legitimate) violence.’17 While a certain co-optation of social forces in rentier monarchies 
and populist republics was necessary for regime survival,18 this was far from being fully 
politically inclusive--as facilitated by competitive elections allowing participation by all 
social forces. The limits of inclusion made the Arab state vulnerable, not only to political 
shocks (such as the Arab uprisings) but also to external infiltration.19 The drive for 
regime survival engenders resistance against such attempted domination. Resistance 
forces seek to de-monopolise a regime’s grip over the above-mentioned three spheres; by 
offering competing ideologies, economic strategies, and, in certain cases, armed 
resistance, oppositional forces create the basis for alternative regimes.   
Whilst state formation provides a generic framework that highlights a regime’s 
drive for domination and an opposition’s resistance, this struggle is punctuated by 
periods of what students of social movements call Contentious Politics (CP): 
episodic, public, collective interaction among makers of claims and their objects when (a) at least 
one government is a claimant, an object of claims, or a party to the claims and (b) the claims 
would, if realized, affect the interests of a least one of the claimants.20  
The CP research agenda raises key questions and provides interesting conceptual tools 
to understand political change, continuity and democratisation in the Arab world: When 
and under what conditions do passive populations collectively mobilise for change? How 
and why does an opportunity become visible for regime contenders? What kind of 
frames do the contenders construct as they struggle for power? What effects would this 
contention have on identity?  
 Departing from state formation and CP, the latest Arab uprisings appear an 
episode of collective interaction that pitted previously passive populations against 
regimes under varying socio-political conditions. By presenting alternative socio-
political visions (democracy, Islamism, freedom, pluralism), contenders challenged the 
incumbent regimes’ monopoly over the ideological sphere, whilst attempting to engage 
and mobilise the latent public.21 For example, the Midan al-Tahrir Square collective 
action was a site of political protest that challenged Mubarak’s monopoly over the 
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national narrative, whilst seeking to mobilise the public for change; it did so by 
imagining and promising an alternative society.22  
The uprisings opened an opportunity for change, but whether the opportunity 
would be realised or not is a different question. What contenders perceive as an 
opportunity, which is ‘an activating mechanism responsible in part for the mobilization 
of previously inert populations’23, regimes and their supporters perceive as a threat. To 
delegitimise antagonists, regimes engage in framing processes, accusing the latter of 
being “terrorists”, “agents of foreign states” or “instigators of instability”. In 
heterogeneous societies, such as Iraq or Syria, interactive framings can activate or 
aggravate identity divides; this occurs when ‘political entrepreneurs draw together 
credible stories from available cultural materials, similarly create we-they boundaries, 
activate both stories and boundaries as a function of current political circumstances, and 
manoeuvre to suppress competing models’.24  
Contentious politics also involves collective violent campaigns that defy a 
regime’s capacity to monopolise coercion. When this occurs, it provides the space for 
contenders to establish new forms of authority: establish order (monopolising coercion 
in “liberated areas”), institutionalise courts, capture sites of economic significance, raise 
new flags, and protect the ‘boundaries’ of the areas they occupy. Regime’s and “counter-
regimes” engage in rival projects of state formation.25 Contentious politics, however, 
need not always be about state (re-) formation; I analytically connect state formation to 
CP because most Arab states remain prone to reconstruction, and contentious politics 
are integral to this process. The Arab uprisings are an episode of intense struggle 
between regimes and their contenders; but the quantitative change in intensity of the 
struggle, its visibility, and the emergence of new actors, claims and forms of political 
mobilisation should not conceal the qualitative continuity of the struggle from the pre-
Uprising period.  
But what does the examination of state formation and contentious politics imply 
for the democratization debate? Contentious politics, which in the Arab world is directly 
linked to state formation/reformation, is a necessary but not sufficient condition for 
democratization. Necessary because contentious politics reflect periods of intense 
struggles between regimes and their rivals, juxtaposing opposing socio-political claims, 
and generating conditions for political change, including democratization. However, as 
the cases of Syria and Iraq will illustrate, there are several variables that can intervene 
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between contentious politics and democratization. Such variables include, but need not 
be limited to, sectarian and ethnic fragmentation, the internalization of external 
geopolitical rivalry, and collective violence, which not only constrain democratization 
but also threaten to fragment the state as a territorial entity.  
 
Back to the Future: the Arab Uprisings and State (re) formation in Iraq and Syria 
State-building and regime erosion in Iraq (1968-2003) and Syria (1963-2011) 
The state formation process in Iraq and Syria—the attempt by Arab nationalist regimes 
to attain political independence, socio-economic development, and nation-building—
since the 1960s fomented the seeds of regime erosion, returning these states to square 
one of state formation half-a-century later26. Regime erosion can be attributed to three 
interrelated trajectories that had varying effects on the two cases: (1) intra-regime and 
regime-opposition struggles for domination led to the monopolisation of power in the 
hands of a few and to mass political exclusion; (2) to reproduce their domination at the 
state level, regimes resorted to kinship ties, contributing—intentionally or 
unintentionally—to the activation and reproduction of identity divides within their 
societies, divides which political contenders utilised for political mobilisation; and (3) 
because of political exclusion and the activation of identity divides, regimes and the 
territorial states in which they dominate became more vulnerable to unanticipated 
shocks (such as the Arab uprisings) and external penetration, which aggravated regime 
erosion and state disintegration. 
First, colonial divisions of the region and later colonial domination in Iraq and 
Syria gave rise to various political ideologies (Arab Nationalist, Baathist, Communist, 
Nationalist, Islamist), seeking liberation, economic development, and, for Arab 
Nationalists, Arab political union. These views reflected the socio-political grievances of 
the time, and contradicted the interests of the ruling elites. But the absence of 
democratic means that could channel these socio-political grievances transformed the 
military, which began to be infiltrated by these ideologies, into a vehicle of political 
change. Whilst the military began to infiltrate the political realm as early as 1936 in Iraq 
and 1949 in Syria, two military coups in 1958 (Iraq) and 1963 (Syria) would trigger 
state formation processes and have lasting effects on both countries. The coups, which 
brought coalitions of revolutionary forces to power, initiated an intra-coalition 
elimination contest: first between Baathists and their Arab Nationalist, Communist and 
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nationalist foes; and second, among the Baathists when they reached power in Iraq 
(1968) and Syria (1963). The elimination contests among Baathists culminated in the 
emergence of the narrowly based regimes of Saddam Hussein in Iraq (indirectly since 
1968 and directly since 1979) and Hafez Assad in Syria (1970). In these processes, 
political foes were purged, detained and killed, laying the foundations of authoritarian 
regimes where the monopoly over the use of violence determined the patterns of other 
social, economic and judicial spheres27.  
To maintain a monopoly over coercion, Assad and Hussein designed in-built 
protection against military coups by diversifying military, security and intelligence 
agencies and creating paramilitaries. The monopoly over coercion facilitated the 
domination of the ideological level; Baathist ideology, as interpreted by the wielders of 
coercive power, became the state ideology: first through the ‘Baathification’ of the 
military and then of society through education, party socialisation, and the media. 
Alternative ideologies were excluded or suppressed. At socio-economic levels, both 
regimes attempted, either through agrarian reforms (Syria) or through oil rent (Iraq), to 
include previously marginal social forces in state-driven developments. Departing from 
his predecessor’s socialist and minoritarian regime, Assad also integrated members of 
Sunni bourgeoisie from Damascus and Aleppo, giving them important political posts in 
the party and government; he, however, maintained a monopoly over security, military 
and foreign policy decisions.28  
In both cases, political exclusion had adverse effects on state-building; the 
political system did not offer opportunities for accountability, especially of regime 
figures whose presence was crucial for regime survival.29 As such, political exclusion 
eroded regimes’ socio-political ties with society. Whilst both regimes did not lose total 
support, political exclusion and repression and elite corruption eroded their legitimacy, 
and formed the basis for political mobilisation when opportunities emerge (such as the 
1978-82 Islamic rebellion in Syria or such as the 1991 uprising in Iraq).  
 Second, ideological and personal rivalries within the Baath party, coupled with 
the struggle to monopolise coercive power, gave rise to the issue of political trust. In 
both cases, Baathist ideology and the political party ceased to form the political cement 
required to tie regimes together. Ideological erosion was countered by a reactivation of 
tribal and sectarian ties. Each regime attempted to install kin in key positions of party 
and state—in particular its coercive agencies. Under Saddam Hussein, the process starts 
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with the ‘Tikitization’ of the Baath in the early 1970s and culminates in direct family rule 
by the late 1990s.30 In Syria, the intra-regime struggles among Baathists began to take a 
sectarian dimension when Salah Jadid purged first several Sunni officers and then 
Ismaili and Druze comrades. In the last round, Assad and Jadid remained as the last 
Alawi Baathist leaders, before Assad’s ‘Corrective Revolution’ overthrew Jadid. Under 
Assad, key security, intelligence, and military posts were primarily allocated to trusted 
Alawi officers.31 
On implication of this process is that it exacerbated the regimes’ alienation in 
society, eroding further its legitimacy. In Iraq, the Baathification and Tikritisation of the 
state not only alienated contenders within the Sunni community, but also gradually 
contributed to the demarcation of sectarian—Sunni-Shi’a—cleavages and exacerbated 
ethnic—Arab-Kurdish—boundaries. Fearing a Shi’a rebellion in the 1970s, Saddam 
Hussein initiated a repressive campaign against all expressions of Shi’a religious and 
political contention, reinforcing Shi’a perception of marginalisation. But the activation of 
sectarian boundaries is not a one-way road, generated only by regime actions; in Iraq it 
was also generated by the increasing political consciousness of Iraqi Shi’as. The 
emergence of the Islamist Dawa Party in 1958, which initially came as a response to the 
Communist ideological challenge, formed an early expression of this consciousness. By 
the late 1970s, the Dawa’s ability to mobilise the Shi’as community against the Baath 
formed a significant threat to Saddam Hussein.32 The identity divides separating the 
Iraqi Arabs from the Kurds started earlier and was aggravated by the failure of 
successive Iraqi regimes to accept Kurdish cultural and regional autonomy.33 In the 
1990s Iraqi Kurds began to enjoy de facto autonomy before, as we shall see below, this 
became constitutional in 2005.  
In Syria, Assad faced an Islamic rebellion culminating in civil war in 1978-1982.34 
This civil war and the regime’s attack on the Sunni bastion of Hama, which killed 
thousands, in 1982 reinforced sectarian divisions and perceptions within Syria, 
undermined the regime’s secular ideology and gave regime contenders the opportunity 
to frame it as sectarian and Alawite. To be sure, the presence of heterogeneous society, 
made up of various sectarian and ethnic communities, as that of Iraq and Syria, does not 
in itself cause sectarian divisions, nor does it imply that the conflict is purely cultural; 
but a heterogeneous society provides the cultural material for political contenders to 
frame the conflict in cultural terms in order to mobilise support. The Islamists targeting 
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of Alawite officers, as in the Aleppo’s artillery school 1979, and the discourse employed, 
which framed the regime in sectarian terms, activated identity divides in this 
contentious episode.35  In this case—unlike after 2011—the sectarian cleavage was 
muted by the fact that the largely Sunni peasantry remained in the regime coalition, co-
opted by Ba’thist agrarian reforms36.  
Thirdly, the combination of domestic political exclusion and identity divides 
exposed Iraq and Syria to external infiltration. The strategic location of both states, in 
the Arab-Israeli conflict region (Syria) and the heart of the Middle East (Iraq), has meant 
that domestic rivalries become integral to the regional (and international) balance of 
power. In the state formation process, the fear of external subversion exacerbated the 
drive to monopolise power domestically.37 Regimes and their contenders perceived 
regional developments as opportunities or threats to alter and maintain the domestic 
power balance. For example, the Syrian civil war in 1978-1982 cannot be divorced from 
Egypt’s pressure on Assad after ties between the two states soured in the wake of the 
Camp David agreements. The Islamists perceived this as an opportunity to topple Assad; 
but it also increased the regime drive to maintain power.38  
Similarly, the 1991 uprising in the southern provinces of Iraq came with the 
perception of (and promise made by the US to) the Shi’as of Iraq that Hussein’s regime 
would be toppled. However, during that uprising, Hussein capitalised on the regional 
and international decision to keep him in power to crush the uprising. Saddam Hussein 
framed the uprisings as an Iranian conspiracy aiming to transform Iraq into an Islamic 
state. The repression of the uprising, however, ingrained sectarian and ethnic 
boundaries in the country.39  
 
The Arab Uprisings and state formation in Iraq and Syria, 2011-2014  
It is in the context of the state formation trajectories examined above that we can 
understand the impact of the uprisings on Iraq and Syria. In the eyes of the Syrian and 
Iraqi opposition groups, the ‘Arab Spring’ presented an opportunity to readdress the 
Iraqi balance of power, which emerged in 2003, and to reform or overthrow the Syrian 
regime. The effects of the uprisings on Iraq and Syria, however, vary.  
 When the uprisings erupted in 2010/11 Iraq had already established regime 
change and inaugurated a proto-democratic experiment. Contrary to the 1991 uprisings 
which failed to materialise in regime change, in 2003 the interests of the Iraqi 
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opposition, especially Kurdish and Shi’a organisations, converged with the US’s strategy 
to topple Saddam Hussein. The removal of Hussein from power paved the way for the 
Iraqi opposition to initiate a new political regime centred on the two main Kurdish 
movements, the Kurdish Democratic Party and Popular Union of Kurdistan, and Shi’a 
movements, al-Dawa, the Sadr Movement, the Supreme Islamic Council in Iraq, and, to a 
lesser extent, the Sunni Iraqi Islamic Party. A new constitution was ratified, satisfying 
the aspirations of the Kurdish movement, guaranteeing cultural and administrative 
autonomy and federal democracy in Iraq; the new order also brought the Shi’a to the 
heart of the political system, making them the dominant actor in the new state-building 
process. A series of largely fair national elections in January and December 2005 and 
2010 consolidated the new political arrangement and demarcated the sectarian and 
ethnic political map of the country.40 What emerged, though not formally presented as 
such, was a form of consociational democracy, which, theoretically at least, accepted the 
presence of political, religious and ethnic communities. As in Lebanon, the 
apportionment of posts in the state aimed to represent and incorporate the main 
communities of the country: the Shi’as took the executive prime minister post, the 
presidency was given to the Kurds, and house speaker to the Sunnis.  
 But this state-building process was fraught with domestic and external problems. 
Domestically, not all Sunni factions accepted the new political order. In opposition to the 
US occupation, to increasing Iranian influence, and to Shi’a and Kurdish political 
dominance, many Sunnis, with some exceptions, refused to legitimise the new regime.41 
Shi’a forces filled the main offices of the state and used state resources to augment their 
social bases and to blackmail and repress their political opponents. This increased 
Sunnis’ perception of marginalisation. The US decision to dismantle the army and the 
‘De-Baathification’ program left hundreds of thousands, of whom many were Sunnis, 
jobless. This further weakened regime legitimacy in Sunni governorates, especially 
Anbar and Salaheddine42. 
 Resistance to the new form of domination and the USA-led occupation began to 
turn both political and violent as early as 2004. Violent resistance targeted the 
rebuilding of security and military institutions, with concentrated attacks on 
recruitment centres, and the occupying forces. Sunni resistance provided the 
opportunity for former Baathists and Saddamists, Sunni tribal forces, and Islamists, 
especially al-Qaida related organisations, to capitalise on Sunni marginalisation to 
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advance their political goals.43 This resistance, in turn, reinforced the Shi’a drive to 
monopolise power. The Shi’a’s fear of a reversal of the state-building process and Sunni 
perception of marginalisation entrenched the Shi’a-Sunni divide.  
The post-2003 Iraqi state-building process intersected with regional geopolitical 
rivalries. Syria, which aimed to destabilise and deter US control in Iraq, hosted former 
Baathists and facilitated the transfer of Islamist jihadists to Iraq.44 For al-Qaida’s Iraqi 
version, the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI)--the original version of the Islamic State of Iraq 
and Syria(ISIS)--Iraqi state failure provided opportunities to fight the US, the Shi’as, 
which were targeted by suicide bombers, and Iran, and to establish a “caliphate”. Faced 
with the threat of regime change, Iraqi military and security forces in collaboration with 
Shi’a militias in turn sought to repress Sunni Islamist militants and cleanse Sunnis of 
certain areas of Baghdad, thereby, further marginalising the community. By 2007, Iraq 
was facing a sectarian civil war. For Sunnis, the new regime intended to repress them, 
impose a Shi’a-dominated system, and provide Iran with greater influence; thus, 
challenging Iraq’s Arab identity. For Shi’as, many Sunnis are intent on reversing the 
nascent democratic system, paving the way for the return of the Baath and legitimising 
al-Qaida attacks on Shi’as. These mutual interpretations not only weakened the 
democratic experience in Iraq, but also eroded the capacity and legitimacy of the new 
regime in Sunni areas of Iraq.  
It is against this background that the Arab uprisings began to impact Iraq in 
2011. In 2011 the US withdrew most of its troops from Iraq. US occupation had, in 
varying degrees, constrained the behaviour of Iraqi political forces. However, American 
withdrawal juxtaposed Iraqi communities, with their varying visions of the country, 
against one another. In a drive to monopolise coercive power in the state, Prime 
Minister Nuri al-Maliki of the Dawa Party clashed with both Shi’a and Sunni militias; in 
his drive to centralise power he installed his own supporters in the state, including 
family members, overriding official institutions.45 Maliki’s confrontation with Sunni 
politicians, such as Tarek Hashemi, Rafi al-Issawi and Saleh al-Mutlak, who accepted the 
political process but aimed to curb Maliki’s power and sought greater Sunni 
incorporation, diminished the remaining Iraqi government channels to the Sunni 
community.  
The first impact of the Arab uprisings, and the geopolitical rivalries they 
engendered, was to exacerbate Iraq’s sectarian and ethnic divisions. In March 2011, the 
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tide of the Arab uprisings reached Syria and assumed a sectarian dimension by 2012. 
The rise of sectarian discourse in the region and the emergence of ostensibly sectarian 
camps, with Iran, the Syrian regime, and Hizbullah on the one hand, and Turkey, Qatar, 
and Saudi Arabia on the other hand came to directly affect Iraq, which became an arena 
for regional rivalries. Saudi Arabia and Turkey capitalised on Sunni disenchantment 
within Iraq to weaken the Shi’a-dominated regime and to curb Iran’s influence in the 
region. This aggravated Shi’a worries and led al-Maliki’s government to transform its 
previous enmity against Assad into support for his survival; Shi’as feared that the 
coming of a “Sunni” regime in Syria would empower Iraqi Sunnis and weaken, if not 
topple, the newly established Shi’a-dominated regime in Iraq. The Iraqi government’s 
support of Assad heightened the domestic Sunni-Shi’a divisions. Many Iraqi Sunnis 
supported the Syrian rebellion against Assad, connecting their own grievances to that of 
their Syrian coreligionists.46 By  2012, Iraqi Sunnis of Anbar and other Sunni regions 
began protests calling for an end to ‘Sunni marginalization’, release of detainees, and for 
Maliki to step down. Dismissing the uprisings as an ‘external conspiracy’, Maliki failed to 
accommodate the demands of the protestors who began to garner support from Sunni 
MPs and politicians.47 
Exploiting the Sunni uprising and regime erosion in Sunni areas, ISIS and former 
Baathists began to occupy areas of western and northern Iraq. In early June 2014, Mosul 
fell to ISIS and by the end of the month, the al-Qaida breakaway declared its ‘Islamic 
State’ on a wide swath of territories ranging from the east of Aleppo in Syria to the 
Sunni-majority regions, including Anbar, Ninenevah, and Mosul in Iraq.48. The quick 
collapse of the Iraqi army in these Sunni areas exposed its weak legitimacy.49 Indicative 
of the sectarian framing encouraged by rival regional powers, when Mosul fell to ISIS, 
Saudi Arabia considered it to be a ‘revolution’ by Sunnis who were frustrated by Maliki’s 
rule.50 
The occupation of most of the Sunni areas by the Islamic State led Mazuud 
Barazani to exploit the Iraqi army’s weakness to occupy the oil-rich and contested 
territory of Kirkuk. Barazani then announced that the Iraqi political process had failed 
and conditions for Kurdish statehood had emerged.51 By August of 2014, the state-
building process in Iraq and the impact of the Arab uprisings did not only besiege 
democratic consolidation, as will be argued in the conclusion, but also threatened the 
disintegration of Iraq as a state. 
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Compared to Iraq, the Arab uprisings had a more damaging effect on Syria. The 
coming of Bashar Assad to power in 2000 reflected a continuation of the regime his 
father had established in Syria. Despite the favourable external opportunities (after the 
2006 Lebanon war, which increased regime legitimacy; the Saudi opening to Syria in 
2008; improved relations with Turkey and France), Bashar al-Assad failed to create a 
more politically inclusive regime. This failure made his regime, and in consequence 
Syria’s territorial integrity, vulnerable to the Arab uprisings, which reached Syria in 
March 2011. Within a few weeks, the realm of politics, which was concentrated in a few 
hands, and which contained and repressed any attempts to promote alternative political 
visions, opened widely for numerous political actors that rose to challenge Assad’s rule. 
In this contentious episode, we observe both a continuation of and innovation in regime-
society contention.  
Initially, Syrian protestors consciously avoided any sectarian or ethnic slogans 
that might alienate Syria’s minorities and that the regime could use to delegitimise the 
opposition. The peaceful protesters called for ‘reform’ and advanced a democratic and 
pluralistic vision, thus challenging Assad’s monopoly over the national narrative.52 But 
the regime’s strategy to prevent any Midan al-Tahrir-like contentious performance led it 
to overreact violently. Beyond the use of violence, Assad, relying on the support of state 
employees, some segments of the urban middle classes, his own Alawi base, and the 
Syrian crony capitalists that had benefited from privatisation schemes,53 staged counter 
political rallies in most of Syria’s cities; he called for a national dialogue; and drafted and 
then held a referendum on a new constitution, ending the Baath’s ‘legal’ monopoly over 
the political system.54 Whilst these regime adaptations could have contributed to 
political reform, they, however, failed to attract support from the Syrian opposition, the 
Syrian National Council (SNC), most of which was in exile and expected a swift fall of the 
regime.55  
  Assad’s survival, however, and the absence of a political agreement on transition 
gave rise to an armed struggle, transforming Syria into a collapsed state marred by a 
civil war. In a span of two years (2011-2013) Syria turned from an influential regional 
actor into a battlefield for geopolitical rivalries. In the eyes of the opposition, political 
protest, on its own, had revealed its limits56. However, despite many defections, the 
army and the Republican Guard remained largely intact. Due to fear of regime’s violence 
or because of the absence of a clear alternative, Syria’s main cities (Damascus and 
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Aleppo) did not instantly rise against the regime. Whilst the Arab uprisings had had a 
demonstration effect, sectarianism in Iraq since 2003 and the bloody fall of Qaddafi in 
Libya, formed counter demonstration effects that restrained revolt in Syria’s big cities. 
Despite the varying origins of the rebellion—from the rise of Salafism in Dera, to 
opposition against religious restrictions in Banyas, to a revolt against the Alawi shabbiha  
in Latakia—it was concentrated in the periphery, where state services and control has 
weakened, before moving to Sunni hotbeds in Hama and Deir el-Zur.57 Assad’s military 
strategy aimed to concentrate efforts on the main cities in order to preserve the 
strategic link between Damascus-Homs-Latakia, but this came at the expense of leaving 
peripheral areas to the control of rebel groups.  
With state weakening and regime loss of territory to the opposition, initially to 
the Free Syrian Army (FSA) of military defectors, Islamist jihadist groups began to see 
an opportunity to establish a foothold in Syria.58 The rise of jihadist groups, such as 
Jabhat al-Nusra and ISIS, aggravated the sectarian divide which the civil war had 
activated. The regime’s Alawite core, memories of the Hama massacre in 1982, and 
regime’s alliance with Shi’a Iran and Lebanon’s Hizbullah fostered sectarian framings 
and mobilisation. The erosion of secular Arab nationalist ideology in the state-building 
process, and Bashar Assad’s failure to articulate a new ideology since 200059, left a 
vacuum that was filled by sectarian and tribal identities.  But despite this, in its 
discourse and through its media outlets, the regime continued to promote a national 
narrative, aiming to demobilise sectarian divisions and framing the conflict as one 
between the “state”, which represents plurality, stability and sovereignty, and the 
“terrorists”, who are agents of external powers wanting the disintegration of the Syrian 
state60. The failure of the opposition to unite ranks, made radical Islamism, manifested 
in the jihadist ISIS and Jabhat al-Nusra, the main political alternative to Assad. Fearing 
for their survival should the Islamists win, most of Syria’s minorities and many of urban 
Sunnis backed the regime. 
What exacerbated the Syrian conflict and shaped its development were regional 
geopolitical rivalries. The opportunity that the uprisings offered to unseat Assad led 
many of his regional foes, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Qatar, to capitalise on domestic 
opposition to achieve their strategic goals. For Saudi Arabia, toppling Assad and 
installing a friendly regime would curtail Iranian expansion, weaken the ‘Resistance 
Axis’, and potentially isolate Iran and Hizbullah. For Turkey and Qatar, the rise of a 
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potentially Islamist (Muslim Brotherhood) regime in Syria would not only contain Iran 
and isolate Saudi Arabia, but would also likely facilitate Turkey’s bid to establish 
economic and political hegemony in the Arab region in alliance with moderate Islamist 
movements. This strategy aimed to fill the vacuum left by the diminishing U.S. Middle 
East role under the Obama administration61. For Iran, Hizbullah, and, as mentioned 
above, the Iraqi regime, a fall of Assad would be a strategic loss and a threat to Shi’a 
influence in the region. Lebanon’s Hizbullah feared that Assad’s fall would diminish the 
movement’s strategic depth in its conflict with Israel.62  
The rivalries of these geopolitical camps began to directly affect the civil war in 
Syria. Each camp began to channel money, arms, and men to its domestic allies in Syria. 
On the one hand, these external infiltrations contributed to the further erosion of the 
Syrian state; but on the other hand, Hizbullah’s direct military intervention and support 
from Iran and Russia kept the regime intact. Geopolitical rivalry pitting Saudi Arabia 
against Qatar and Turkey weakened and further divided the Syrian opposition, 
contributing to Assad’s survival and to the rise of the more robust Jihadist groups. The 
control of the rebel areas by Jihadists provided them with the opportunity to apply their 
political vision. The execution of rivals, the violent application of Islam, and the sectarian 
attitude of these groups augmented the feeling of fear among Syria’s minorities and gave 
credence to the regime’s proposition that the most viable alternative to its rule would be 
the jihadists. 
By the end of 2013, the Syrian war had caused more than 100,000 deaths, two 
million refugees,63 and the disintegration of the country. In June 2014, more than half a 
century after the Baath Party found roots in Syria and Iraq, a new ideological movement 
represented in ISIS announced its “Caliphate”, straddling the Sykes-Picot political 
boundaries, and dominated over most of eastern Syrian and western Iraq.64  
 
Conclusion: Prospects and Obstacles to Democratisation in Iraq and Syria 
The Arab uprisings was an episode of contentious politics that challenged the existing 
political order in Iraq and Syria and formed an opportunity to renegotiate the basis of 
political rule in each of the two cases. However, due to the coercive state-building 
process in Iraq and Syria, their heterogeneous social composition, and geo-political 
locations, the Arab uprisings led to state disintegration in both countries. Whilst the 
challenge to the state boundaries represented by ISIS may not endure, largely due to the 
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socio-political resistance this movement faces in Arab societies and to the resistance of 
the international and regional systems to a revision of state boundaries, both countries 
face long term challenges to consolidate (Iraq) or reconstruct (Syria) political systems.  
 Whilst the politicisation of sectarian and ethnic identities in Iraq and Syria 
appears to cause state disintegration and civil wars, this politicisation, under the right 
conditions, might contribute to democratisation. Iraq has already made an important 
transition towards political pluralism, accepting the presence of various sectarian and 
ethnic grievances, visions, and interests. In ratifying a constitution, holding elections, 
allowing for a pluralist press, and designing state institutions, Iraq had begun to 
translate political pluralism into political institutions. However, the US occupation until 
2011, Sunni dissatisfaction, and sectarian and geopolitical rivalries, especially under the 
rule of al-Maliki, stalled the attempt to build a consociational democracy. As a divided 
state with a fragile democracy, Iraq’s political development and stability, like that of 
Lebanon, largely depends on its regional setting. A favourable and less polarised 
regional setting might contribute to stabilising Iraq and furthering its democratic 
experiment—and vice versa. To find a solution to the crisis, the US called for a ‘national 
unity’ government, indicating the need to reincorporate the Sunnis. When Iran and the 
Iraqi Shi’a supreme leader Ayatollah Sistani made similar calls, the room for al-Maliki to 
seek a third term diminished, paving the ground for the appointment of Haidar al-Abadi. 
Regional fears of ISIS expansion, especially into Irbil or Baghdad, led regional rivals to 
converge in calling for national unity in Iraq. Saudi Arabia was among the first to 
recognise the newly-appointed Shi’a Prime Minister65.  
 Whilst the incorporation of various communities in a consociational system is a 
prerequisite for its success, this system, as the experience of Lebanon suggests, 
generates its own problems. The participation of different actors in ‘national unity’ 
governments, which usually includes the main representatives of each community, 
leaves little room for an effective political opposition, and, hence, accountability. The 
apportionment of state positions—in the judiciary, security and intelligence forces, 
central banks—among the ruling multi-communal coalition weakens these institutions 
since most of the main appointments are political patronage meant to serve the political 
power position of rival politicians within the state apparatus. These appointments 
increase the vulnerability of political institutions to political rivalries and hinder their 
capacity to become effective regulators of the political system.  
 19 
Unlike Iraq, Syria still has to make the transition to political pluralism. The 
inability of the opposition to topple Assad and of Assad to reproduce his former 
domination is lengthening the war. Geopolitical rivalries over Syria are directly 
contributing the continuation of the struggle. Syria takes a central place in the strategies 
of the vying camps in the region since developments there are key to regional shifts in 
the balance of power. Whilst prospects for democratization in Syria are remote, an 
external agreement that would preserve the minimum interests of regional (Saudi 
Arabia and Iran) and international (USA and Russia) actors could still trigger a political 
process that would facilitate internal political change. Such a framework, similar to the 
Taif Accord, which brought the Lebanese civil war to an end, would widen the political 
scope to include various political forces. In their discourses, both the regime and the 
opposition have avoided explicitly proposing a consociational (sectarian) arrangement, 
preferring to present a ‘national’ platform. However, any political opening and dialogue 
is very likely to juxtapose heterogeneous Syrian communities against on another; 
beyond the Syrian national identity that binds all groups, and in the absence of 
ideological divides (with the possible exception of Islamism-non-Islamism) among 
different Syrian groups, sectarianism and--in the case of Syria’s Kurds--ethnicity are 
very like to form the new boundaries of a future political system. Minority groups, 
including the one represented by the regime, would require assurances that a future 
political system would guarantee them influence at the centre of decision-making, in 
coercive agencies of the state, and in parliament.  
Whilst state formation and crystallisation long preceded democratisation in 
Europe, in countries like Iraq and Syria, and for that matter Lebanon, Libya, Yemen, 
these two processes are converging. Iraq and Syria are finding that to reconstruct (and 
avoid the collapse of) their states they will need to open the political arena to various 
communal and political actors, triggering a process of democratisation. Successful state 
formation will mean democratisation. But this process is, and will be, burdened by major 
challenges, not least the geopolitical rivalries; by political Islam, especially extremist 
versions, such as ISIS, that challenge democracy as a political system; by transnational 
sectarianism that is inflaming divided societies; and by the sectarian/ethnic 
apportionment that enervate institutions, decrease accountability, and facilitate 
corruption in consociational versions of democracy.   
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